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I. Statutory Authority 
[Evidence Code Section 1010-1027] 
II. Constitutional Protection for 
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
ill. Rationale 
N.Exceptions to Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege 
A. Matters bearing directly on the 
emotional or mental condition of 
the defendant voluntarily 
disclosed by the patient. 
B. Psychotherapist appointed by 
order of the court. 
C. Proceeding initiated at the 
request of the defendant to 
determine his sanity to be tried, 
his sentence, or punishment. 
D. Communication made in aid of 
the commission of a crime or tort 
or to escape apprehension of a 
crime or tort. 
E. Dangerous person exception 
F. Patient under age of 16 and the 
psychotherapist has reason to 
believe that he/she has been the 
victim of a crime. 
G. Child Abuse an Neglect Preven-
tion Act 
I. STATUTORY AI/1HORITY 
The Evidence Code has a number of 
sections which apply to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. These sections are 
organized as follows: 
Evidence Code Section 1014 states 
and defines the privilege. 
Evidence Code Sections 1010-1012 
define the crucial terms of psychothera-
pist (1010), patient (1011) and confiden-
tial communication (1012). 
Evidence Code sections 1013and 1015 
address the assertion of the privilege by 
defining the "holder of the privilege 
(1013) and describing when the psyche>-
therapist must claim the privilege (1015). 
Evidence Code Sections 1016-1027 set 
out the exceptions under which the privi-
lege will not apply. 
Eyidence Code section 1010 (Psyche>-
therapist Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "psychothera-
pist" means: 
(a) A person authorized, pr reason-
ably believed by the patient to be 
authorized, to practice medicine in 
any state or nation who devotes, or 
is reasonably believed by the pa-
tient to devote, a substantial por-
tion of his or her time to the prac-
tice of psychiatry. 
(b) A person licensed as a psychole>-
gist under Chapter 6.6 (commenc-
ing with Section 2900) of Division 
2 of the Business and Professions 
Code. 
(c) A person licensed as a clinical se>-
cial worker under Article 4 (com-
mencing with Section 9040) of 
Chapter 17 of Division 3 of the 
Business and Professions Code, 
when he or she is engaged in ap-
plied psychotherapy of a 
nonmedical nature. 
(d)A person who is serving as a 
school psychologist and holds a 
credential authorizing such ser-
vice issued by the state. 
(e) A person licensed as a marriage, 
family and child counselor under 
Chapter 13 (commencing with 
Section 4980) of Division 2 of the 
Business and Professions Code. 
(I) A person registered as a psycho-
logical assistant who is under the 
supervision of a licensed psy-
chologist or board certified psy-
chiatrist as required by Section 
2913 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, or a person registered 
as a marriage, family and child 
counselor intern who is under the 
supervision of a licensed marriage, 
family and child counselor, a li-
censed clinical social worker, a li-
censed psychologist, or a licensed 
physician certified in psychiatry, 
as specified in Section 4980.44 of 
the Business and Professions 
Code. 
(g) A person registered as an associate 
clinical social worker who is under 
the supervision of a licensed clini-
cal social worker, a licensed psy-
chologist, or a board certified psy-
chiatrist as required by Section 
4996.20 of the Business and Profes-
sionsCode. 
(h) A person exempt from the Psy-
chology Licensing Law pursuant 
to subdivision (d) of Section 2909 
of the Business and Professions 
Code. 
(i) A psychological intern as defined 
in Section 2911 of the Business and 
Professions Code. 
(j) A trainee, as defined in subdivision 
(c) of Section 4980.03 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code, who is 
fulfilling his or her supervised 
practicum required by subdivi-
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sion (b) of Section 4980.40 of the 
Business and Professions Code. 
(k) There is no privilege under subdi-
visions (h), (i), and (j) in any crimi-
nal proceeding. 
Evidence Code section 1010.5 (Appli-
cation of Privilege to Educational Psy-
chologist) states: 
A communication between a patient 
and an educational psychologist, li-
censed under Article 5 (commenc-
ing with Section 4986) of Chapter 13 
of Division 2 of the Business and 
Professions Code, shall be privi-
leged to the same extent, and subject 
to the same limitations, as a commu-
nication between a patient and a 
psychotherapist described in subdi-
visions (c), (d), and (e) of Section 
1010. 
Evidence Code section 1011 (Patient 
Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "patient" 
means a person who consults a psy-
chotherapist or submits to an exami-
nation by a psychotherapist for the 
purpose of securing a diagnosis or 
preventive, palliative, or curative 
treatment of his mental or emotional 
condition or who submits to an ex-
amination of his mental or emo-
tional condition for the purpose of 
scientific research on mental or emo-
tional problems. 
Evidence Code section 1012 (Confi-
dential Communication Between Patient 
and Psychotherapist Defined) states: 
As used in this article, Jf confidential 
communication between patient 
and psychotherapist" means infor-
mation, including information ob-
tained by an examination of the pa-
tient, transmitted between a patient 
and his psychotherapist in the 
course of that relationship and in 
confidence by a means which, so far 
as the patient is aware, discloses the 
information to no third persons 
other than those who are present to 
further the interest of the patient in 
the consultation, or those to whom 
disclosure is reasonably necessary 
for the transmission of the infonna-
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tion or the accomplishment of the 
purpose for which the psychothera-
pist is consulted, and includes a di-
agnosis made and the advice given 
by the psychotherapist in the course 
of that relationship. 
Evidence Code section 1013 (Holder 
of Privilege Defined) states: 
As used in this article, "holder of the 
privilege" means: 
(a) The patient when he has no guard-
ian or conservator. 
(b) A guardian or conservator of the 
patient when the patient has a 
guardian or conservator. 
(c) The personal representative of the 
patient if the patient is dead. 
Evidence Code section 1014 (Who 
May Claim Privilege) states: 
Subject to Section 912 and except as 
otherwise provided in this article, 
the patient, whether or not a party, 
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, 
and to prevent another from disclos-
ing, a confidential communication 
between patient and psychothera-
pist if the privilege is claimed by: 
(a) The holder of the privilege; 
(b) A person who is authorized to 
claim the privilege by the holder of 
the privilege; or 
(c) The person who was the psycho-
therapist at the time of the confi-
dential communication, but such 
person may not claim the privilege 
if there is no holder of the privilege 
in existence or if he is otherwise 
instructed by a person authorized 
to permit disclosure. 
The relationship of a psychotherapist 
and patient shall exist between a psycho-
logical corporation as defined in Article 9 
(commencing with Section 2995) of 
Chapter 6.6 of Division 2 of the Business 
and Professions Code or a licensed clini-
cal social workers corporation as defined 
in Article 5 (commencing with Section 
4998) of Chapter 14 of Division 2 of the 
Business and Professions Code, and the 
patient to whom it renders professional 
services, as well as between those pa-
tients and psychotherapists employed 
by those corporations to render services 
to those patients. The word "persons" as 
used in this subdivision includes part-
nerships, corporations, associations and 
other groups and entities. 
Evidence Code section 1014.5 (Treat-
ment of Minor by Psychotherapist) 
states: 
Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, with respect to situa-
tions in which a minor has re-
quested and been given mental 
health treatment or counseling pur-
suant to Section 25.9 of the Civil 
Code, the professional person ren-
dering such mental health treatment 
or counseling has the psychothera-
pist privilege. 
Evidence Code section 1015 (When 
Psychotherapist Must Claim Privilege) 
states: 
The psychotherapist who received 
or made a communication subject to 
the privilege under this article shall 
claim the privilege whenever he is 
present when the communication is 
sought to be disclosed and is autho-
rized to claim the privilege under 
subdivision (c) of Section 1014. 
Evidence Code section 1016 (Condi-
tion of Patient in Issue) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle as to a communication relevant 
to an issue concerning the mental or 
emotional condition of the patient if 
such issue has been tendered by: 
(a) The patient; 
(b) Any party claiming through or 
under the patient; 
(c) Any party claiming as a benefi-
ciary of the patient through a con-
tract to which the patient is or was 
a party; or 
(d) The plaintiff in an action brought 
under Section 376 or 377 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure for dam-
ages for the injury or death of the 
patient. 
Evidence Code section 1017 (Ap-
pointed Psychotherapist) states: 
(a) There is no privilege under this 
article if the psychotherapist is ap-
27 
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pointed by order of a court to ex-
amine the patient, but this excep-
tion does not apply where the psy-
chotherapist is appointed by order 
olthe court upon the request of the 
lawyer for the defendant in a 
criminal proceeding in order to 
provide the lawyer with informa-
tion needed so that he or she may 
advise the defendant whether to 
enter or withdraw a plea based on 
insanity or to present a defense 
based on his or her mental or emo-
tional condition. 
(b) There is no privilege under this 
article if the psychotherapist is ap-
pointed by the Board of Prison 
Terms to examine a patient pursu-
ant to the provisions of Article 4 
(commencing with Section 2960) 
of Chapter 7 of Title I of Part 3 of 
the Penal Code. 
Evidence Code section 1018 (Services 
of Psychotherapist Sought to Aid in 
Commission of Crime or Tort or to Es-
cape) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle if the services of the psycho-
therapist were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit or 
plan to commit a crime or a tort or to 
escape detection or apprehension 
after the commission of a crime or 
tort. 
Evidence Code section 1019 (Parties 
Claiming Under Deceased Patient) 
states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle as to a communication relevant 
to an issue between parties all of 
whom claim through a deceased 
patient, regardless of whether the 
claims are by testate or intestate suc-
cession or by inter vivos transaction. 
Evidence Code section 1020 (Breach 
of Duty Arising Out of Psychotherapist-
Patient Relationship in Issue) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle as to a communication relevant 
to an issue of breach, by the psycho-
therapist or by the patient, of a duty 
arising out of the psychotherapist-
patient relationship. 
Evidence Code section 1021 (Inten-
tion of Deceased Patient With Respect to 
Writing Affecting Interest in Property in 
Issue) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle as to a communication relevant 
to an issue concerning the intention 
of a patient, now deceased, with re-
spect to a deed of conveyance, will, 
or other writing, executed by the 
patient, purporting to affect an in-
terest in property. 
Evidence Code section 1022 (Validity 
of Writing Executed by Deceased Patient 
Affecting Interest in Property in Issue) 
states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle as to a communication relevant 
to an issue concerning the validity of 
a deed of conveyance, will, or other 
writing, executed by a patient, now 
deceased, purporting to affect an 
interest in property. 
Evidence Code section 1023 (Proceed-
ing in Criminal Action to Determine San-
ity) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle in a proceeding under Chapter 
6 (commencing with Section 1367) 
ofTitie 10 of Part 2 of the Penal Code 
initiated at the request of a defen-
dant in a criminal proceeding to de-
termine his sanity. 
Evidence Code section 1024 (Danger-
ous Patient) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle if the psychotherapist has rea-
sonable cause to believe that the pa-
tient is in such mental or emotional 
condition as to be dangerous to him-
self or to the person or property of 
another and that disclosure of the 
communication is necessary to 
present the threatened danger. 
Evidence Code section 1025 (Proceed-
ing to Establish Competence) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle in a proceeding brought by or 
on behalf of the patient to establish 
his competence. 
Evidence Code section 1026 (Informa-
tion Required to be Reported or Re-
corded by Psychotherapist) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle as to information that the psy-
chotherapist or the patient is re-
quired to report to a public em-
ployee or as to information required 
to be recorded in a public office, if 
such report or record is open to pub-
lic inspection. 
Evidence Code section 1027 (Circum-
stances for No Privilege) states: 
There is no privilege under this ar-
ticle if all of the following circum-
stances exist: 
(a) The patient is a child under the age 
ofl6. 
(b) The psychotherapist has reason-
able cause to believe that the pa-
tient has been a victim of a crime 
and that disclosure is in the best 
interest of the child. 
II. CONSmunONAL PROTECTION FOR 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST.pAnENT PRIVILEGE 
The confidentiality of communica-
tions between patients and their psycho-
therapists does not depend solely on the 
statutory psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege created by the Evidence Code. 
These communications are also pro-
tected by the constitutional right of pri-
vacy under the federal and state constitu-
tions. Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206 
Cal. App. 3d 784, 790,254 Cal. Rptr. 24. In 
California a citizens right to privacy is 
independently protected under Article I, 
section 1 of the California constitution. 
The court in In re: Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 
3d 415,423,85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467P.2d 557 
concluded that any compelled disclosure 
of a confidential communication in-
volves the constitutional right to privacy 
of the patient, and not of the psycho-
therapist. 
Although no cases indicate that the 
statutory privilege is any narrower than 
what the constitution would demand, 
the attorney should be alert to the appli-
cability of constitutional right to privacy 
cases in arguing whether or not a confi-
dential, psychotherapist-patient com-
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munication should be protected from 
disclosure in a given situation. Counsel 
objecting to the disclosure should always 
raise the constitutional violation as an 
independent basis for the objection as 
well as the violation of the statutory 
privilege. An error by the court on a con-
stitutional issue has different implica-
tions in the standard of review on appeal. 
The importance of the Constitutional 
right to privacy is clear when Proposition 
lIS attempted to amend the constitu-
tional right to privacy for criminal defen-
dants. The California Supreme Court 
struck down that portion of the proposi-
tion holding that it "contemplates such a 
far-reaching change in our governmental 
framework as to amount to a qualitative 
constitutional revision, an undertaking 
beyond the reach of the initiative pro-
cess". Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 
Cal. 3d 336, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326. 
III. RATIONALE 
The psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege extends to psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists as well as a host of other persons 
who are enumerated in Evidence Code 
Section 1010. This statutory privilege is 
based upon the premise "that certain 
forms of anti-social behavior may be pre-
vented by encouraging those in need of 
treatment for emotional problems to se-
cure the services of a psychotherapist". 
Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. 
App. 3d 784, 788, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24. In Re: 
Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 434-435, 85 
Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P. 2d 557. 
The Law Revision Commission ob-
served the need for insuring the confi-
dential nature of this relationship and 
observed: 
persons in need of treatment some-
times refuse such treatment from 
psychiatrists because the confidenti-
ality of their communications can-
not be assured ... Many of these per-
sons are seriously disturbed and 
constitute threats to other persons in 
the community. Accordingly, ... [the 
evidence code now] establishes a 
new privilege that grants to patients 
of psychiatrists a privilege much 
broader in scope than the ordinary 
physician patient privilege. AI-
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3 
though it is recognized that the 
granting of the privilege may oper-
ate in particular cases to withhold 
relevant information, the interests of 
society will be better served if psy-
chiatrists are able to assure patients 
that their confidences will be pro-
tected. 
Generally a patient, whether or not a 
party in a proceeding, has a privilege to 
refuse to disclose, and to prevent others 
from disclosing, a confidential commu-
nication between the patient and his/her 
psychotherapist. Evidence Code Section 
1014. The privilege can be claimed by the 
holder of the privilege, a person autho-
rized to claim the privilege by the holder, 
or the psychotherapist. Evidence Code 
Section 1013. The psychotherapist must 
claim the privilege whenever he or she is 
present when the communication is 
sought to be disclosed and is authorized 
to claim the privilege. Evidence Code 
Section lOIS. 
The Assembly Committee on Judi-
ciary Comment to Evidence Code Sec-
tion 405 clearly states that the "burden of 
proof is on the objeciing party to show 
that a privilege is applicable". Therefore, 
if the disputed preliminary fact is 
whether a psychotherapist-patient rela-
tionship existed at the time that the state-
ments were made, the burden of proof is 
on the party asserting the privilege to 
convince the judge of the existence of the 
relationship. 
The Legislative Committee to Evi-
dence Code Section 1014 states in perti-
nent part: 
This article has created a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege that provides much 
broader protection than the physician 
patient privilege. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee 
comment stated "A broad privilege 
should apply to both psychiatrist and 
certified psychologists. Psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy are dependent upon 
the fullest revelation of the most intimate 
details of the patients life. Unless a pa-
tient or research subject is assured that 
such information can and will be held in 
utmost confidence, he will be reluctant to 
make the full disclosure upon which di-
agnosis and treatment or complete and 
accurate research depends. 
• Accordingly, this article estab-
lishes a new privilege that grants 
patients of psychotherapists a privilege 
much broader in scope that the 
ordinary physician-patient privilege. 
Although it is recognized that the 
granting of the privilege may operate 
in partirular cases to withhold relevant 
information, the interests of society will 
be better served if psychiatrists are able 
to assure patients that their confidences 
will be protected. 
InPeoplev. Cabral (1993) 12 Cal. App. 
4th 820, IS Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, the defen-
dant was convicted of rape, sodomy, and 
continuous sexual abuse of a child. After 
appellant was taken into custody he 
wrote a letter to a psychotherapist at the 
Stanislaus County Adult Sex Offender 
Treatment Program. In the letter the ap-
pellantstated he "had sexually molested 
his daughter and that he want[edj to be 
in the ... program." Appellant testified 
that he wrote the letter "in hope of get-
ting county time, going through some 
program, getting probation just like 
these other gentlemen and going back 
home to my family". 12 Cal. App. 4th at 
824, IS Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. 
Arguing that this letter was protected 
by the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
appellant contended that the court com-
mitted prejudicial error in admitting it 
into evidence. 
The court analogized the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege to the attor-
ney-client privilege and looked at 
whether the letter was an attempt to es-
tablish the psychotherapist-patient rela-
tionship or if the relationship was al-
ready clearly established. 
If the relationship is not clearly estab-
lished, the privilege is to be strictly con-
strued, but where the relationship has 
been established, the basic policy behind 
the attorney-client privilege to promote 
the relationship by safeguarding the con-
fidential disclosures of the client and the 
advice given by the attorney supports a 
liberal construction in favor of the exer-
cise of the privilege. 
In Cabral, the court reasoned that the 
appellant was attempting to establish the 
existence of the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship, therefore, it narrowly con-
strued Evidence Code Section lOll. Us-
ing the "dominant purpose test" the 
court concluded that the letter was not 
"for the purpose of securing a diagnosis 
or ... treatment of his mental or emotional 
29 
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condition ... " Evidence Code Section 
lOll. 
Appellant's asserted purpose in writ-
ing to Dr. Johnson, i.e., to avoid prison 
sentence, was not protected under 1014. 
Moreover, nowhere in his testimony 
does appellant suggest that even part of 
his purpose was to receive treatment. 
Assuming arguendo that, implicitly, part 
of appellant's purpose in writing to Dr. 
Johnson was to obtain treatment, we can-
not conclude that appellant has met his 
burden in establishing that it was his 
dominant purpose. 12 Cal. App. 4th 827, 
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 870. 
People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 
505, 194 Cal. Rptr.431,668P. 2d 738,lnre: 
Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal. 
Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557. 
Evidence Code Section 1012 defines a 
confidential communication as: 
Information, including information 
obtained by an examination of the 
patient, transmitted between a pa-
tient and his psychotherapist in the 
course of that relationship and in 
confidence by a means which, so far 
as the patient is aware, discloses the 
information to no third persons 
other than those who are present to 
further the interest of the patient in 
the consultation, or those to whom 
disclosure is reasonably necessary 
for the transmission of the informa-
tion or the accomplishment of the 
purpose for which the psychothera-
pist is consulted, and includes a di-
agnosis made and the advice given 
by the psychotherapist in the course 
of that relationship. 
In People v. Henderson (1977)19 Cal. 
3d 86, 97, 98, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 560 P.2d 
1180, a criminal defendant claimed that 
the trial court erred in admitting evi-
dence of statements that he made to a 
psychotherapist who interviewed him 
whIle he was in jail. Rejecting hisconten-
tion that these statements were protected 
by the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
the California Supreme Court stated: 
Immediately prior to his interview 
with Dr. Griswold, Henderson was 
advised that he had a right to remain 
silent, that anything he said could be 
used against him and that he had the 
right to have his attorney present. 
He was then asked, "Having in 
mind and understanding your 
rights ... are you willing to talk with 
Dr. Griswold?" He responded, 
"Yes, I will." In addition, Dr. 
Griswold informed Henderson that 
the interview was being conducted 
at the request of the district attorney. 
••• 
These facts amply support the trial 
court's determination that Henderson's 
statements to Dr. Griswold were volun-
tarily made under circumstances devoid 
of the confidentiality fundamental to an 
assertion of the patient-psychotherapist 
privilege. We find no error. [Id. at 97-981 
In Re: Edward D. (1976) 61 Cal. 
App.3d 10, 132 Cal. Rptr. 100, was a pro-
ceeding under the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code Section 600 to bring two mi-
nor boys under the control of the juvenile 
court. The Department of Social Services 
referred the boys' mother to a psycholo-
gist for an evaluation. At the hearing, the 
court permitted the psychologist to tes-
tify over the mother's objection that this 
testimony was privileged. The court of 
appeal held: 
The record shows ... that appellant 
understood that she was to be exam-
ined by Dr. Cramer to provide a di-
agnosis or evaluation which would 
be considered in determining 
whether she would be given cus-
tody. She knew that the juvenile 
court judge was the one who would 
make that decision ... thus, while the 
information remained confidential 
as between appellant and the world 
generally, the transmission of the 
information to the juvenile court 
judge was proper in order to accom-
plish her purpose. 61 Cal. App.3d at 
15. 
The court went on to conclude: 
The necessary implication is that an 
examination may be made in confi-
dence for a particular purpose, and 
that a communication made for the 
accomplishment of that purpose 
neither breaches the confidence nor 
destroys the privilege. 61 Cal. 
App,3d at 15. 
The psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege is construed liberally in favor of the 
patient and his right to privacy, which 
includes a general right not to disclose 
information about treatment for mental 
or emotional problems. Because of the 
nature of the practice of a psychothera-
pist, the mere disclosure of the existence 
of the relationship reveals, at least in a 
general sense, the nature of the problems 
and gives rise to the inference of mental 
or emotional problems. Therefore, the 
fact of the existence of the relationship 
must be privileged as well. For this rea-
son, mere disclosure of the patient's 
identity is held to violate this privilege. 
Smith v Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal. 
App.3d 136, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145, Scull v. 
Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 
784,254 Cal. Rptr. 24. 
There is the added consideration that 
the harm of disclosure of a relationship 
with a psychotherapist is greater than 
disclosures of other relationships, due to 
the stigma that society often attaches to 
mental illness. Scull v. Superior Court 
(1988) 206 Cal. App. 3d at 789. 
In Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206 
Cal. App.3d 784, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24. the 
defendant, a psychiatrist, was charged 
with sexually molesting a teenaged pa-
tient. The district attorney moved for dis-
closure of the names, addresses, and tele-
phone numbers of the defendant's fe-
male patients over the past ten years in 
order to contact them to determine 
whether any of them had been abused or 
molested by him. The court recognized a 
need to balance the need for the disclo-
sure against any encroachment on the 
patient's fundamental right to privacy. 
The court in Scull found that the 
government's proffered use of the evi-
dence was "insufficient to over come the 
patients righttoconfidentiality" and that 
there were other, less intrusive ways to 
obtain this information". 206 Cal. 
App.3d at 792. 
In reviewing the scope of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege the court ob-
seIVed: 
"Evidence Code Section 1014 ... af-
fords a broad privilege that prevents 
the disclosure of communications 
made between a patient and a psy-
chotherapist. 206 Cal. App.3d at 788. 
• •• 
The disclosure that an individual is 
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seeing a therapist may well serve to dis-
courage any treatment and thereby inter-
fere with the patien~s freedom to seek 
and derive the benefits of psycho-
therapy ... 'The patients purpose would 
be inhibited and frustrated if his psycho-
therapist could be compelled to give up 
his identity without his consent. 206 Cal. 
App.3d at 788. 
The court also held that even if the 
government could show that their need 
for the disclosure was sufficiently com-
pelling, they had failed to demonstrate 
that the potential benefits of <:pntacting 
the patients would outweigh the harm 
caused by the intrusion. The court noted 
the myriad of trauma and embarrass-
ment that could be caused by persons 
who may be already emotionally 
troubled. 
The result would be that those in need 
of psychotherapy may be discouraged 
by fear of disclosure from seeking the aid 
of psychotherapists, and those who have 
been cured may be needlessly harmed. 
Under the circumstances which have 
been presented, there is no permissible 
exception to the patient-psychotherapist 
privilege that compels the disclosure of 
the names of petitioners former patients. 
206 Cal. App. 3d at 794. 
The Legislate Committee Comment 
to Evidence Code section 912 states in 
pertinent part: 
Subdivision (d) is designed to main-
tain the confidentiality of communi-
cations in certain situations where 
the communications are disclosed to 
others in the course of accomplish-
ing the purpose for which the law-
yer, phYSician, or psychotherapist 
was consulted. Nor would a 
physician's or psychotherapist's 
keeping of confidential records nec-
essary to diagnose or treat a patient, 
such as confidential hospital 
records, be a waiver of the privilege, 
even though other authorized per-
sons have access to the records. 
Similarly, the patien~s presentation 
of a physician's prescription to a 
registered pharmacist would not 
constitute a waiver of the physidan-
patient privilege because such dis-
closure is reasonably necessary for 
the accomplishment of the purpose 
for which the physicianisconsulted. 
See also Evidence Code § 992. 
In Farrell 1.. v. Superior Court (1988) 
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203 Cal. App. 3d 521, 527, 528, 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 25, a witness's communications 
with other participants in a group 
therapy session were held to be within 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
The court stated: 
In our view , the other participants in 
a group therapy session are those 
who are present to further the inter-
est of the patient in the consultation 
... or the accomplishment of the 
purpose for which the psychothera-
pist is consulted. [citation omitted] 
The language of Evidence Code sec-
tion 1012 plainly indicates that com-
munications made by patients to 
persons who are present to further 
the interests of the patient comes 
within the privilege. "Group 
therapy" is designed to provide 
comfort and revelation to the pa-
tient who shares similar experiences 
and or difficulties with other like 
persons in the group. The presence 
of each person is for the benefit of 
the others including the witness/ 
patient, and is d~igned to facilitate 
the patient's treatment. Communi-
cations such as these, when made in 
confidence, should not operate to 
destroy the privilege. 
In Luhdorff v. Superior Court (1985) 
166 Cal. App. 3d 485, 490, 492, 212 Cal. 
Rptr. 516, the trial court issued a discov-
ery order allowing the prosecution to 
discover records relating to conversa-
tions that a criminal defendant had with 
a clinical social worker (Gramajo) at a 
mental health clinic. The appellate court 
vacated the discovery order. It held that 
although the social worker was not 
within the statutory definition of "psy-
chotherapist" the communications were 
privileged because they were necessary 
for the transmission of information to the 
psychologists and psychotherapists who 
supervised the clinic, and the accom-
plishment of the purpose for which the 
psychotherapeutic services were sought: 
Here, although Gramajo was not a 
therapist to whom the privilege at-
tached, he worked under such a per-
son generally, and petitioner's case 
was ultimately controlled and su-
pervised by persons to whom the 
privilege attached. Gramajo testi-
fied he initially interviewed clients 
looking for reactions and behaviors 
in order to devise a fldiagnosis and a 
treatment plan." The treatment 
plan was then approved by his su-
pervisor, Dr. Smith, a licensed clini-
cal psychologist, or by a center psy-
chiatrist. Gramajo needed their ap-
proval to implement his treatment 
plan. 
Dr. Smith testified he read Gramajo's 
admission summaries and progress 
notes and met with him at least weekly to 
discuss cases, to advise as to procedures 
and to evaluate Gramajo's performance. 
Dr. Smith approved all treatment plans 
and occasionally made suggestions as to 
changes. Gramajo worked with Dr. 
Smith and a health services psychiatrist 
in a team effort for all patients. Gramajo 
was responsible and usually would do 
only individual counseling, while medi-
cal treatment of a patient was controlled 
by a psychiatrist at the health center. 
Gramajo clearly falls within the cat-
egory of persons reasonably necessary 
for the transmission of information or the 
accomplishment of the purpose for 
which the psychotherapist is consulted. 
In Grosslight v. Superior Court (1977) 
72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 506, 508, 140 Cal. 
Rptr. 278, the parents of a 16-year-old girl 
were sued in a personal injury action on 
the theory that they had failed to exercise 
adequate parental control over her de-
spite knowledge of her propensity for 
violence. The plaintiff sought disclosure 
of the girl's psychiatric records on the 
theory that the records might contain 
some statements by the parents showing 
knowledge of the daughter's condition. 
The court held that communications be-
tween the parents and the psychiatrist 
were protected regardless of whether 
they were a means of transmitting infor-
mation or facilitating the transmission of 
information to or from the daughter. 
In the case at bar there is a factual 
showing that the communication (if any) 
between the parents and hospital per-
sonnel is to further the child's interest in 
communication with a psychiatrist or 
with psychiatric personnel or that it was 
necessary for the transmission of infor-
mation to the psychotherapist. How-
ever, such communications between par-
ent and hospital are for the purpose of 
furthering the child's interest in commu-
nicating with the psychotherapist and 
are to facilitate the diagnosis and treat-
31 
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ment of the child.[Id. at 506] 
••• 
Applying the rule of liberal construc-
tion and the underlying policy of section 
1014 as above quoted, we hold that the 
privilege established by the section in-
cludes all relevant communications to 
psychotherapists and to psychiatric per-
sonnel by intimate family members of 
the patient. [Id. at 508] 
The Court in Re: Lifschutz (1970) 2 
Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 made clear 
that the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege is not absolute in stating, "Even 
though a patient's interest in the confi-
dentiality of the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship rests, in part, on constitu-
tional underpinnings, all state "interfer-
ence with such confidentiality is not pro-
hibited. 2 Cal. 3d at 432. The burden, 
rests with the party seeking to introduce 
the evidence which is claimed to be privi-
leged, to demonstrate thatit falls outside 
the scope of the privilege. 
In Scull v. Superior Court (1988) 206 
Cal. App.3d 784, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24 the 
government sought disclosure of the 
names of the former patients of the de-
fendant who was charged with sexually 
molesting teen-age patients. The court 
issued a writ of mandate holding that the 
trial court erred· in ordering the disclo-
sure and held: 
When the right to disclosure clashes 
with a privilege, the court is required to 
'indulge in a careful balancing of the 
need for disclosure against the funda-
mental right of privacy. 
... 
We find the proffered use of the evi-
dence sought by the prosecution to be 
insufficient to overcome the patients 
right to confidentiaJity. 
... 
The evidence being presently sought 
might be obtained by less intrusive 
means than [disclosure of the names of 
the patients]. ... An order for discovery 
that advances a compelling state purpose 
ever so slightly, while causing significant 
hann to the privacy interests of others, is 
not acceptable. 206 Cal. App.3d at 790, 
792,794. 
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPIST.pAnENT PRIVILEGE 
Any exception to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege must be construed 
narrowly. People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 
Cal. 3d 505,513, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668P. 
2d 738, People v. Iohn B., (1987) 192 Cal. 
App. 3d 1073, 1077, 237 Cal. Rptr. 659. 
[AI Matt ... -.lng directly on the 
emotional or mental condition of the 
defendant voluntully dlscl_ by 
patient. 
The Senate Committee on Judiciary 
Comment following Evidence Code Sec-
tion 1014 states: 
Although the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege applies in criminal 
proceedings, the privilege is not 
available to a defendant who puts 
his mental or emotional condition in 
issue, as, for example, by a plea of 
insanity or a claim of diminished 
responsibility. See Evidence Code 
sections 1016 and 1023. In such a 
proceeding, the trier of fact should 
have available to it all information 
that can be obtained in tegard to the 
defendant's mental or emotional 
condition. That evidence can often 
be furnished by the psychotherapist 
who examined the patient-defen-
dant. 
The psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege does not apply to any communica-
tion which is relevant to an issue which is 
raised by the patient during the trial. This 
exception is narrowly construed and ap-
plies only to disclosures of information 
which bear directly on the specific emo-
tional or mental condition which the pa-
tient has voluntarily initiated and dis-
closed in the case. 
This includes when a defendant en-
ters a plea of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" and asks the trier of fact to find 
that he was insane at the time of the com-
mission of the offense. In these cases, the 
government has the right to have the 
court appoint an expert to examine the 
defendant and be prepared to testify at 
trial. The defense will not be able to ex-
clude this evidence on the grounds that it 
is privileged. 
If the trial is bifurcated, with a sepa-
rate trial on the question of guilt from the 
trial on the question of sanity, the testi-
mony from the experts is not admissible 
during the guilt phase. If the government 
seeks to introduce the evidence at that 
time, the defense should object that it is 
privileged and not relevant to the issues 
raised on the question of guilt. The de-
fense should also object that the testi-
mony violates the defendants constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination 
since the communications by the defen-
dant provide at least part of the basis for 
the opinion.] 
In In Re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 
431,435,85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, a 
psychiatrist was deposed in an action in 
which the plaintiff, his patient, sought, 
among other things, damages for severe 
mental and emotional suffering alleg-
edly resulting from an assault. When he 
refused to reveal whether he had seen the 
plaintiff or had any records relating to 
plaintiff, he was held in contempt by the 
trial court. The California Supreme 
Court held that the trial court properly 
adjudged the psychiatrist in contempt. 
In order to avoid further proceedings, it 
also undertook to determine the scope of 
the patient-litigant exception: 
As we explain more fully below, the 
patient-litigant exception allows only a 
limited inquiry into the confidences of 
the psychotherapist-patient relationship, 
compelling disclosure of only those mat-
ters directly relevant to the nature of the 
specific" emotional or mental" condition 
which the plaintiff has voluntarily dis-
closed and tendered in his pleading or in 
answer to discovery inquiries. 
... 
[T]he "automatic" walverof privilege 
contemplated by section 1016 must be 
construed not as a complete waiver of the 
privilege but only as a limited waiver 
concomitant with the purposes of the 
exception. Under section 1016 disclosure 
can be compelled only with respect to 
those mental conditions the patient has 
II disclosed . .. by bringing an action in 
which they are in issue" [citation omit-
ted]; communications which are not di-
rectly relevant to those specific condi-
tions do not fall within the terms of sec-
tion 1016's exception and therefore re-
main privileged. Disclosure cannot be 
compelled with respect to other aspects 
of the patient-litigan(s personality even 
though they may, in some sense, be rel-
evant to the substantive issues of litiga-
tion. The patient thus is not obligated to 
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sacrifice all privacy to seek redress of a 
specific mental or emotional injury; the 
scope of the inquiry permitted depends 
on the nature of the injuries which the 
patient-litigant himself has brought be-
fore the court. 
In People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 
140,284 Cal. Rptr.511, the defendant was 
convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death. On appeal ofthe penalty 
phase the defendant revealed his psychi-
atric history during direct examination. 
At the end of direct examination the 
prosecution sought immediate access to 
all of defendant's hospital records. De-
fendant claimed that he had not tendered 
his mental condition within the meaning 
of the "patient-litigant" exception. Evi-
denceCodeSection 1014, 1016. Nonethe-
. less, the California Supreme Court held 
that the exception applied. 
Defendant broadly argues that the 
court erred in "fail(ingJtoplaceany limi-
tation" on prosecutorial access to the 
records. The documents are not included 
in the appellate record, and defendant 
does not describe their content. 
••• 
Defendant essentially claimed that 
mental problems had prompted his ad-
mission into (a psychiatric hospitalJ as an 
arrestee in this case. He also accused (an-
other psychiatric hospitalJ of profes-
sional malpractice, but suggested he had 
nonetheless adjusted well (there]. The 
court did not err in concluding that de-
fendant had waived the privilege insofar 
as it might otherwise apply to recorded 
information about his condition, treat-
ment, and performance at these institu-
tions. 54 Cal.3d 190 
The court relied on In re Lifschutz and 
noted: 
The exception recognizes that it 
would be unfair to allow the patient 
to describe" a t length to the jury in a 
crowded courtroom the details of 
his supposed ailment, and then 
neatly suppress the available proof 
of his falsities by wielding a 
weapon, nOminally termed a privi-
lege". 54 Cal. 3d at 190. 
In Re Spencer(I965) 63 Cal. 2d 400,46 
Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P. 2d 33, the defendant 
was convicted of first degree murder and 
robbery and sentenced to death. He filed 
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3 
a writ of habeas corpus before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court and alleged that 
the court erred in allowing the testimony 
of a court appointed psychiatrist during 
the guilt phase of the trial. The court de-
nied the writ as to the guilt phase of the 
trial and held that it is proper to admit the 
testimony of a court appointed psychia-
trist during the guilt phase of the trial 
once the defendant has placed his mental 
condition at issue with the defense of di-
minished capacity or insanity. (The writ 
was granted as to the penalty phase on 
other issues). The court set out three con-
ditions which would insure the protec-
tion of the defendant's constitutional 
rights: 
(IJ"before submitting to an examina-
tion by court appointed psychiatrists, a 
defendant must be represented by coun-
sel or intelligently and knowingly have 
waived that right. Defendant's counsel 
must be informed as to the appointment 
of the psychiatrists." 
(2J ''If after submitting to an examina-
tion, a defendant does not specifically 
place his mental copdition at issue at the 
guilt trial, then the court-appointed psy-
chiatrist should not be permitted to tes-
tify at the guilt trial." 
(3J"If defendant does specifically 
place his mental condition into issue at 
the guilt trial, then the court appointed 
psychiatrist should be permitted to tes-
tify at the guilt trial, but the court should 
instruct the jurors that the psychiatrists 
testimony as to the defendant's incrimi-
nating statements should not be re-
garded as proof of the truth of the facts 
disclosed by such statements and that 
such evidence may be considered only 
for the limited purpose of showing the 
information upon which the psychiatrist 
based his opinion." 63 Cal. 2d at 412. 
Finally, the court observed that when 
the trial court makes a determination as 
to whether the defendant has placed his 
mental condition at issue, it is not suffi-
cient if the defendant has merely entered 
a plea of "not guilty" and is contesting 
his/her guilt on the charge. Rather the 
court must find that the defense has pre-
sented a defense such as "diminished 
capacity", or epilepsy and has directly 
placed his mental condition at issue. In 
Re: Spencer 63 Cal. 2d at 412, fn.lO. 
In People v. Danis (1973) 31 Cal. 
App.3d 782, 107 Cal. Rptr. 675 the defen-
dant raised a defense of diminished ca-
pacity for the charge of auto theft. After 
the defense presented psychiatric testi-
mony in support of the defense, the gov-
ernment moved to have the defendant 
examined by a psychiatrist and pre-
sented that doctors testimony in rebuttal. 
The court applied the test set forth in 
Spencer and found that this defendant 
had placed his mental condition at issue 
and had therefore waived any objection 
to a court appointed psychiatrist testify-
ing on the issue of diminished capacity. 
The trial court in Danis also took the ad-
ditional precaution and "specifically 
prohibited (the doctor] from testifying to 
any incriminating statements made by 
the defendant during the examination". 
31. Cal. App. 3d at 785. 
IBI Pay_therapist appointed by Older 
of the court 
The privilege does not apply to com-
munications made to a doctor appointed 
by the court or Board of Prisons. 
Evidence Code Section 1017 provides 
an exception to the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege whene the psychotherapist 
is appointed by order of the court to ex-
amine someone. These appointments are 
authorized under Evidence Code Sec-
tions 730-733, (Appointment of Expert by 
Court, Payment of Court Appointed Ex-
pert, and Calling, Examining court ap-
pointed expert, Right to Produce other 
expert Testimony); Penal Code Section 
1027 (insanity plea) and Welfare and In-
stitutions Code Section 7107 (sex offend-
ers). However, if the defense requests the 
court to appoint an expert to assist in the 
preparation of the defense, then the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege will ap-
ply. The comment to Evidence Code sec-
tion 1017 recognizes that the confidenti-
ality must remain intact in such a situa-
tion in case the defendant decides not to 
proceed with a defense that places his 
mental or emotional condition in issue. If 
the defense does decide to place his men-
tal state at issue, the patient-litigant ex-
ception may apply and any communica-
tions made to the psychotherapist which 
are relevant to the issue raised may be 
admissible at the trial. Evidence Code 
Section 1016. 
Defense counsel should be alert to the 
fact that in certain instances the attomey-
client privilege may protect certain com-
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munications that are not protected 
within the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. People v. Lines (I975) 13 Cal. 3d 500, 
119 Cal. Rptr. 225,531 P.2d 793,Peoplev. 
Goldbach (I972) 27 Cal. App. 3d 563, 103 
Cal. Rptr. 800. 
In People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 
500,119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793, the 
defendant entered a plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity and had a bifurcated 
trial, one phase on the issue of guilt and 
the second phase on the issue of s.anity. 
At the sanity phase, the government 
called two doctors who had previously 
been appointed under Evidence Code 
730 and 1017 to examine the defendant 
and prepare confidential reports. The 
defense objected arguing that this testi-
mony violated the attorney-client privi-
lege. The California Supreme Court 
agreed. The court stated: 
The doctors were appointed by the 
court for the purpose of examining the 
defendant for his own benefit and of 
fully informing his counsel as to the na-
ture and extent of defendant's mental 
condition to the end of assisting counsel 
in the preparation and presentation of a 
defense. All information obtained by the 
doctors from their examination of the 
defendant and the reports thereof fur-
nished to his attorney constituted confi-
dential communications protected. from 
disclosure by the attorney-client privi-
lege. The fact that the psychiatrists were 
appointed by the court rather than pri-
vately employed by counsel in no way 
affects the confidentiality of these com-
munications ... " 13 Cal. 3d at 510. 
[n Re: Eduardo A. (1989) 209 Cal. 
App. 3d 1038, 261 Cal. Rptr,68, involved 
a proceeding under the Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 387 to detennine 
whether the children should be removed 
from the mother's custody. The mother 
had allowed the father to have contact 
with the children in violation of a previ-
ous court order. At the hearing, the 
mother's therapist was called as a wit-
ness. The trial court upheld the mother's 
claim that the testimony involving her 
confidential communications with the 
therapist were privileged and the Cali-
fornia Supreme court agreed. The court 
held that fact that the mother was re-
ferred to this doctor by the juvenile court 
did not make him "appointed by the 
court" within the meaning of Evidence 
Code section 1017 and therefore no ex-
ception applied. The court explained the 
distinction: 
A juvenile court's referral of a parent 
for counseling after a finding that the 
children had been molested is obviously 
consistent with [providing protection to 
the children and the preservation of the 
family]. The purpose of such counseling 
is to assist the parent in understanding 
the problem and preventing its recur-
rence, thereby protecting the children 
and attempting to preserve the family 
structure. 
In contrast, a court ordered psychiat-
ric examination is aimed at determining 
for the information of the patient and \or 
for the court, the patient's mental and 
emotional condition. It is an information 
gathering tool, rather than a treatment 
tool. The exception to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege in Evidence Code 
Section 1017 is directed toward this lat-
ter, information gathering examination. 
We find no basis for broadening this ex-
ception to encompass the very different 
situation of court ordered counseling. 
This narrow view of the privilege excep-
tion is consistent with the general rule 
that the statutory psychother~pist-pa­
tient privilege is to be liberally construed 
in favor of the patient. (citation omitted) 
209 Cal. App. 3d at 1041-1042. 
[CI _ProceMlng Initiated at the request 
of the defendant to determine his 
sanity, competence, or punishment 
Evidence Code section 1023 sets for 
an exception to the privilege when there 
is a proceeding. initiated at the request of 
the defendant to determine his sanity to 
be tried, sentenced or punished. The pro-
cedure for this hearing is set forth in Pe-
nal Code Sections 1367 - 1375.5. This pro-
ceeding is separate from the plea of "not 
guilty by reason of insanity" which may 
be entered by a defendant and results in 
a separate trial on the issue of sanity. 
Since in the latter case the defendant is 
introducing his mental state into issue, 
the "patient-litigant" exception to the 
privilege would govern those issues. 
Evidence Code Section 1016. 
[D) Communication made In aid of_ 
commission of a crtme or tort or to 
escape apprehension lifter the 
commission of a crime or a tort. 
Evidence Code Section 1018 sets forth 
the "tort/crime" exception to the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege. The Law 
Revision Commission Comment to evi-
dence code Section 1018 referts to the 
Comment to Evidence Code Section 997 
which states: 
This section is considerably broader 
in scope than section 956 which provides 
that the lawyer client privilege does not 
apply when the communication was 
made to enable anyone to commit or plan 
to commit a crime or fraud. Section 997 
creates an exception to the physician pa-
tient privilege where the services of the 
physician were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to 
commit a crime or tort, or to escape detec-
tion or apprehension after commission of 
a crime or tort. 
[E) Dangerous person exception 
The privilege does not apply if the 
psychotherapist has reasonable cause to 
believe that the patient will be a danger 
to himself or others. 
Under Evidence Code Section 1024, a 
confidential communication between a 
psychotherapist and a patient are not 
privileged if the psychotherapist has rea-
sonable cause to believe that the patient 
is in a mental or emotional condition 
such that 1) he is dangerous to himself or 
to the person or property of another, and 
2) that disclosure of the communication 
is necessary to prevent the threatened 
danger. 
The Law revision Commission Com-
ment explains the balance in applying 
this exception in stating: 
Although this exception might in-
hibit the relationship between the 
patient and his psychotherapist to a 
limited extent, it is essential that ap-
propriate action be taken if the psy-
chotherapist becomes convinced 
during the course of treatment that 
the patient is a menace to himself or 
others and the patient refuses to per-
mit the psychotherapist to make the 
disclosure necessary to prevent the 
threatened danger. 
The Comment also notes that this ex-
ception to the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege is narrower than the compa-
rable exception provided in the marital 
communications privilege (Evidence 
Code Section 982) and the physician-pa-
tient privilege. (Evidence code Section 
1004). 
In Peoplev. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 
522,280 Cal. Rptr. 631, the California 
Supreme Court found that the substance 
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of a psychotherapisfs warning to a po-
tential victim of danger posed by the de-
fendant and the defendant's statements 
made in therapy which triggered a warn-
ing fell within the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. The court held that a pa-
tient does not involuntarily waive the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege for all 
statements and all purposes merely be-
cause some of the patient's statements 
made in therapy justified disclosure in 
the form of a warning to the victim. 
We agree that the mere fact that some 
statements are non privileged by opera-
tion of section 1024 does not automati-
cally make all of the defendant's confi-
dential communication to his therapist 
available to the prosecution. 53 Cal. 3d. 
at 649. 
In People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal. 3d. 
583,268 Cal. Rprt. 399, a criminal 
defendant's threats to kill or to have 
killed may have fallen within the "da,n-
gerous patienf' exception, but the court 
opined that it did not need to resolve this 
issue "because at the time of trial [the 
psychotherapist] had already revealed 
the communications that were [confi-
dential], therefore they were no longer 
confidential" . 
The question is not whether the psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege has been 
waived or the (dangerous patient excep-
tion] applies, but whether the privilege 
may be claimed. at all once the communi-
cation is no longer confidential. Whether 
the psychotherapist "reasonably be-
lieves" that the revelation of the commu-
nication is necessary also becomes irrel-
evant once the communication has lost 
its confidential status. The reasons for 
the privilege-protecting and promoting 
the therapeutic relationship-and thus the 
privilege itself, disappear once the com-
munication is no longer confidential.[Id 
at 620J. 
In Menendez v. Superior Court of Los 
Angeles (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 435, 11 Cal. 
Rprt. 2d 92, the California Supreme 
Court clarified its holding in Clark. 
Menendez. stated that Clark must not be 
broadly interpreted so as to require that 
the communication be and remain confi-
dential in order to be privileged. 
Clark holds oniy that when a psycho-
therapist discloses a patient's threat to 
the patient's intended victim ... the dis-
closed threat is not covered by the privi-
lege. 
The privilege can cover a communica-
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tion that was never, in fact, "confiden-
tial" - so long as it was made in confi-
dence. The communication need only 
comprise of "information ... transmitted 
between a patient and his psychothera-
pist in the course of that relationship and 
in confidence by a means, which, so far as 
the patient is aware discloses the infor-
mation" to no "outside" third person 
(Evidence Code Section 1012) ... Similarly 
the privilege can cover a communication 
that has lost its "confidential status". 3 
Cal. 4th at 447. 
Tn Menendez, a psychologist's 
audiotaped notes of his session with de-
fendants, Erik and Lyle Menendez, were 
admissible because they fell within the 
dangerous-patient exception. The broth-
ers had made threats of harm that were 
not only aimed at the psychologist, Dr. 
Oziel, but also at his wife, Laurel Oziel, 
and his lover, Iudalon Smyth. 
The defense sought to keep the tapes 
excluded from trial but the superior 
court rejected their claim that they were 
protected under the psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. The Menendez brothers 
filed a petition for writ of mandate and/ 
or prohibition in the Court of Appeal that 
was summarily denied. The California 
Supreme Court granted review and 
transferred the matter to the Court of 
Appeal with direction to vacate its sum-
mary denial and cause an alternative 
writ to issue. The Court of Appeal again 
denied the petition. Subsequently, the 
California Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Wharton and thus granted 
review of the Menendez petition. 
In light of Wharton the court looked at 
the audiotapes and each session sepa-
rately. One of the audiotapes contained 
Dr. Oziel's notes relating to two sessions 
with both of the Menendez brothers; one 
contained Dr. Oziel's notes from one ses-
sion with Erik; and one contained an ac-
tual session conducted with Lyle and 
Erik. 
With regard to portion of the tape 
containing Dr. Oziel's notes of his Octo-
ber 31 session the court noted that at the 
outset the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege was available. The court found it 
irrelevant that a third party, Iudalon 
Smyth, overheard some of the communi-
cations as an eavesdropper, and that the 
communications lost their confidential 
status through disclosure to the potential 
victims and through Smyth's subsequent 
dissemination. 
The notes reflect the "confidential 
communication[s] between patient[s] 
and psychotherapist" (Evidence Code 
Section 1014). "transmitted" .. .in the 
course of [the psychotherapeutic] rela-
tionship and in confidence by a means 
which, so far as [Lyle and Erik] [were] 
aware, disclose[d] information to not 
"outside" third person. 
The court also found that the "dan-
gerous-patient" exception was appli-
cable to this portion of the tape. Prior to 
this particular session, Erik had revealed 
in detail to Dr. Oziel the planning and 
execution of the murder of Jose and Mary 
Louise Menendez. After Lyle found out 
about his brother's confession Dr. Oziel' s 
notes reflect that Lyle was "very, very 
unhappy and now would have to think 
about whatto do with this situation." Dr. 
Oziel "clearly was getting the message 
that...Lyle was telling me that he was 
considering killing me, and .. .it was very 
clear from Erik that Erik had the same 
feeling". 7 Cal. App. 4th 147, 153, 279 
Cal. Rptr. 521, 524. 
"[The dangerous-patient exception] 
conditions were met: Dr. Oziel had rea-
sonable cause to believe that Lyle and 
Erik were dangerous to himself directly 
and to Laurel Oziel and Iudalon Smyth 
collaterally, and that disclosure to the 
two women was necessary to prevent 
any harm". 
The superior court .. .impliedly recog-
nized that the "reasonableness" of the 
requisite "reasonable cause to believe" 
must be determined in light of the stan-
dards of the psychotherapeutic commu-
nity. The test is objective, but takes ac-
count of all the relevant circumstances; it 
is based on the norms prevailing among 
psychotherapists as a group, but allows 
broad.discretion to the individual psy-
chotherapist. In certain cases, expert tes-
timony as to the relevant standards may 
be necessary. Here, it was not: the evi-
dence all but compelled the conclusion of 
"reasonableness". In any event, expert 
testimony bearing on the standards was, 
in fact, presented by Dr. Oziel himself. 
Dr. Oziel disclosed to Laurel Oziel 
and Judalon Smyth, in separate warn-
ings against any collateral harm, all the 
communication made at this session and 
reflected. on audiotape, having reason-
able cause to believe that the 
Menendezes were dangerous and that 
disclosure of these communications was 
necessary. 7 CaI.App.4th at 153. 
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Using the same rationale, the court 
found the" dangerous patient" exception 
applicable to the portion of the audiotape 
containing Dr. Oziers notes of his No-
vember 2 session with Lyle and Erik. At 
this session 'Th. Oziel informed the peti-
tioners that although the session was 
confidential, they would not be if peti-
tioners threatened Dr. Oziel or anyone 
else." 
Although by the end of the session Dr. 
Oziel was somewhat less fearful, he still 
believed that petitioners would have 
killed him "were it not for the fact that I 
had explained to them that I had notes 
kept in a safety deposit box with instruc-
tions to reveal them upon my death," 
and that petitioners were "absolutely 
capable" of murdering him. 7 Cal. App. 
4th at 155. 
Considering the portion of the audio-
tape containing Dr. Oziel's notes of his 
November 28 session with Erik the court 
found that the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege was available at the outset. 
This finding is contrary to the court of 
appeal's conclusion that the purpose of 
the session particular to this tape was not 
for the purposes of therapy. 
The court of appeal's express legal 
basis was its belief that "Dr. Oziel was 
motivated by self preservation, and [the 
Menendezes1 were motivated by self in-
terest" . 
••• 
In any event, motive is largely, if not 
totally, immaterial. It appears that in vir-
tually all psychotherapy, what motivates 
the participants is not psychotherapy for 
its own sake. For example, the psycho-
therapist is sometimes motivated by self-
interest, as when he earns his living 
solely through his practice. For his part, 
the patient is sometimes motivated by 
self-preservation, as when he struggles 
to resist the temptation of suicide or an-
tisocial conduct. As a general matter, the 
dispositive fact is what the participants 
do, not why. 3 Cal. 4th at 454. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that "evidence was insufficient to 
establish that Dr. Oziel had reasonable 
cause to believe that disclosure was nec-
essary." Thus there was no "dangerous-
patient" exception with regard to this 
portion of the audiotape. 
Although murders were discussed 
during part of the session, the majority of 
the session was devoted to a discussion 
of Erik's fear of Lyle ... Dr. Oziel stated in 
his notes that he "still continued to feel 
threatened and to believe that at any 
moment if Lyle perceives that in any 
way, shape, or form I am capable 
of ... giving information to anyone, that 
Lyle is fully capable of trying to encour-
age Erik to, or arrange for, my murder or 
anyone else's." 7 Cal. App. 4th at 155, 
156. 
Likewise, the "dangerous patient" 
exception did not operate with the por-
tion of the audiotape containing the re-
cording of Dr. Oziel's December 11 ses-
sion with Lyle and Erik. The court ac-
c~pted the lower court's finding that the 
November 28 and December 11 session 
"were simply restatementS ... an amplifi-
cation of similar communications [of ear-
lier sessions]." The court also found that 
the "disc1osure-is-necessary require-
ment was not met as to this session." 
In re Kevin F. (1989) 213 Cal. App.3d 
178,261 Cal. Rptr. 413, (rehearing denied 
10/25/89), Kevin appeals his adjudica-
tion on the charge of arson alleging error 
in the admission into evidence of a confi-
dential communication to his psycho-
therapist in which he confessed to a 
crime. In November, 1982, Kevin was 
committed to a residential program for 
an unrelated offense. In February, 1983, 
during a mandatory counseling session, 
Kevin told his psychotherapist, Hobbs, 
that he had stolen money from a house 
and then set fire to it even though he 
knew that people were inside. Hobbs did 
not record this conversation or report it 
to anyone until June, 1983 when she dis-
closed it to his probation officer. At trial, 
the court admitted these statements un-
der Evidence Code Section 1024, the 
"dangerous patient" exception to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
The court of appeal found there was 
sufficient evidence for the finding of dan-
gerousness including the fact that Kevin 
was not responding to treatment, that he 
was fascinated with fire, and he was sus-
pected of setting a fire at the program. 
The court did not address the doctors 
failure to disclose this information for 
such a long period of time. 
The court In Kevin F. also held that 
Evidence Code Section 1024applies even 
where there is no specific, identifiable 
victim. The court explained that the ex-
ception to the privilege is written in 
broad language and only requires a 
showing that the patient, represents a 
general threat or danger to the commu-
nity at large. The court distinguished this 
showing from that which is required 
when a psychotherapist is sued in a civil 
case where it is alleged that he/she was 
negligent for failing to warn the plaintiff 
of the impending danger which the client 
posed. In those cases, the court has found 
a breach of the psychotherapist's duty 
only when there is a readily identifiable 
victim to whom the disclosures were 
necessary to prevent danger. (Citing 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Cali-
fomia (1976) 17Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
14,551 P.2d 334. 
In People v. Hopkins (1975) 44 Cal. 
App. 3d 669, 674, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61, the 
defendant was accused of brutally beat-
ing an elderly woman in the course of 
committing a number of crimes. The 
same day, after receiving assurances of 
confidentiality, he told a psychiatrist of 
his crimes. His motion to suppress a sub-
sequent confession to police on the 
ground that it resulted from disclosure of 
a confidential psychotherapist-patient 
communication was denied. Assuming 
that the confession in fact resulted from 
the psychiatrist's disclosure of confiden-
tial communications, the appellate court 
held that the denial of the motion was 
nonetheless proper because the trial 
court was justified in finding that the 
communications were not privileged: 
But Hopkins makes no mention in his 
briefs of the qualifying Evidence Code 
section 1024 which states: "There is no 
privilege under this article if the psycho-
therapist has reasonable cause to believe 
that the patient is in such mental oremo-
tiona I condition as to be dangerous to 
himself or to the person or property of 
another and that disclosure of the com-
munication is necessary to prevent the 
threatened danger." In its January 1965 
official comment to the then proposed 
Evidence Code section 1024, the Call1or-
nia Law Revision Commission stated: 
"Although this exception might inhibit 
the relationship between the patient and 
the psychiatrist to a limited extent, it is 
essential that appropriate action betaken 
if the psychotherapist becomes con-
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vinced during the course of the treatment 
that the patient is a menace to himself or 
others and the patient refuses to permit 
the psychiatrist to make the disclosure 
necessary to prevent the threatened dan-
ger." 
••• 
From the evidence the trial court rea-
sonably concluded that the psychothera-
pist had reasonable cause to believe that 
Hopkins was "in such mental or emo-
tional condition as to be dangerous to 
himself or to the person or property of 
another and that disclosure of the com-
munication [was] necessary to prevent 
the threatened danger." 
Under the circumstances Hopkins 
held no privilege under Evidence Code 
section 1014. The trial court did not err in 
denying the motion to suppress. [Id. 674J 
In Luhdorff v. Superior Coun 
(1985) 166Cal. App.3d 485, 212 Cal. Rptr. 
516, the defendant was charged with, 
inter alia. burglary, kidnapping and 
rape. The district attorney filed a motion 
for discovery of communications be-
tween the defendant and a clinical social 
worker. The trial court granted the mo-
tion finding that the communications did 
not fall within the privilege, and if they 
did they could be disclosed under the 
"dangerous person exception". Evi-
denceCodeSection 1024. The defendant 
sought a writ of mandate or prohibition 
to prevent discovery of the records. The 
court of appeal granted the writ and di-
rected the trial court to set aside its dis-
covery order. The court held that the 
communications were privileged and 
that the finding of dangerousness was 
not supported by the record. 
"Here, there was no evidence pre-
sented that petitioner was a danger to 
other persons or property. The records 
indicate petitioners suicidal feelings re-
sulted from remorse and guilt; there was 
no indication petitioner ever took or was 
going to take affirmative steps concern-
ing these feelings ... the clinic did not con-
sider petitioner presently or in the future 
to be a danger to himself..." 166 Cal. 
App.3d at 494. 
Counsel should note this exception 
allows for the disclosure of information 
or communications where the patient is 
deemed to be dangerous. The compel-
ling social policy of preventing harm to 
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others does not allow the patient to take 
advantage of the privilege. However, 
this exception does not apply where the 
doctor is the person who is deemed to be 
dangerous. In such a case, the privilege 
still belongs to the patient, and there is no 
basis to preclude that patient from assert-
ing his/her privilege. Scull v. Superior 
Court (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 784, 793, 
254 Cal. Rptr. 24.J 
The dangerous patient exception to the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege contin-
ues even after the danger ceases to exist. 
In People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal. 
App. 3d 874, 881, 185 Cal. Rptr. 155, the 
defendant was convicted of murder. The 
trial court permitted two intern psy-
chologists to testify that the defendant 
had told them he intended to kiil the vic-
tim. Assuming that these statements 
would otherwise be within the scope of 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
the appellate court held that they were 
not privileged by virtue of the dangerous 
patient exception established by Evi-
dence Code section 1024. In reaching its 
decision, the court rejected defendant's 
argumentthatthe exception was inappli-
cable at the time of trial because there 
was no longer any danger to the victim: 
Defendant's theory, again assuming 
that the communications to the students 
were privileged, is that although no privi-
lege existed when the threats were made, 
the communications became privileged 
because by the time of trial, the victim was 
dead and "disclosure" was no longer 
"necessary to prevent . . . danger." Even 
that oontention is without merit. Evidence 
Code section 1024 provides categorically 
that there "is no privilege" as to certain 
communications. '11 the preliminary facts 
upon which Evidence Code section 1024 
rests were present at a time prior to the 
injury complained of, section 1024 pre-
vents any privilege from attaching." [Id at 
881] 
In Mavroudis v . Superior Court 
(1980) 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 603,604, 162 
Cal. Rptr. 724, a suit against a psychiatrist 
and other defendants was predicated on 
allegations that the psychiatrist had neg-
ligently failed to warn the plaintiffs that 
a patient posed a danger to them. The 
plaintiffs sought discovery of the 
psychiatrist's records and, when the trial 
court denied their motion to compel pro-
duction, petitioned the appellate court 
for a writ of mandate. The appellate 
court vacated the order denying the dis-
covery motion and remanded the case 
with directions to redetermine the mo-
tion. In doing so, it rejected the defen-
dants' contention that the dangerous 
patient exception established by Evi-
dence Code section 1024 did not apply 
because the patient no longer presented 
a danger to the plaintiffs: 
A literal reading of Evidence Code 
section 1024 would limit its provisions to 
a prospective application. Both the lan-
guage of the statute and the Law Revi-
sion Commission Comment speak in 
terms of "threatened danger." There is 
authority, however, for a retrospective 
application of that section. 
Though the disclosure at trial was no 
longer necessary to prevent threatened 
danger, the court in People v. Hopkins, 
supra, relied upon section 1024 when the 
conditions upon which that section is 
predicated existed at the time of the origi-
nal disclosure. Similarly, in a civil pro-
ceeding in which the plaintiff alleges a 
breach of the defendant's therapist's 
duty enunciated in Tarasoff, the court 
may determine the applicability of the 
exception after the fact. If the prelimi-
nary facts upon which Evidence Code 
section 1024 rests were present at a time 
prior to the injury complained of, section 
1024 prevents any privilege from attach-
ing and the psychiatric records are sub-
ject to discovery in the subsequent pro-
ceeding. [Id. at 64J 
(F) Patient under ace of .. .teen and the 
psychotherapist .... reaaon to believe 
that he/_ has _the victim of the 
crime. 
Evidence Code Section 1027 provides 
that there is no psychotherapist-patient 
privilege when all of the circumstances 
set forth exist: 
1) the patient is under 16 years of age, 
2) the psychotherapist has reasonable 
cause to believe that the patient 
has been the victim of a crime, and 
3) the disclosure of the communica-
tion is in the best interest of the 
child. 
The Law revision Commission Com-
mentto this section states that this excep-
tion is analogous to the" dangerous pa-
tient" exception of Evidence Code sec-
tion 1024. The comment also states that 
this exception is necessary to permit dis-
37 
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closure of these communications in a 
proceeding in which the commission of 
such a crime is the subject of inquiry. 
In People v. Caplan (]987) 193 Cal. 
App. 3d 543, 238 Cal. Rptr. 478, Caplan 
was convicted of several acts involving 
sexual abuse of a child, Cindy. Through-
out the trial, the defense sought discovery 
of Cindy' s psychiatric records and the tes-
timony of the three psychotherapists who 
treated her before, during and after the 
complained of sexual abuse. The trial 
court denied these requests and found 
that Cindy's psychotherapist patient 
privilege was paramount. The court of 
Appeal found this denial to be error and 
remanded the case for the trial court to 
review the evidence which was improp-
erly excluded. The trial court was directed 
to determine whether the information 
would have changed the outcome of the 
trial, and if so, to provide a new trial. 
The court observed that in deciding 
this case there was more involved than 
the defendant's constitutional right of 
confrontation against the patient's con-
stitutional right of privacy. The court dis-
cussed the application of Evidence Code 
Section 1027 and stated: 
We view the exception in Evidence 
Code Section 1027 as another ve-
hicle through which the psycho-
therapist who is treating a child un-
der the age of 16 and has some rea-
son to believe that child abuse is 
ongoing or has occurred discloses 
such information both to satisfy the 
mandatory reporting requirements 
and to further the best interest of the 
child. 
*** 
We thus interpret Evidence Code sec-
tion 1027 as a limited removal of the 
child-patient's privilege and placement 
with the psychotherapist who treated the 
child at the time the requirements of the 
exception were met. The psychothera-
pist, not the child, is the one who must 
claim the privilege by stating that it is not 
in the best interest of the child. Such con-
struction balances the competing state 
interests of detecting and preventing 
child abuse on the one hand and "the 
state's interest in facilitating the 
ascertainment of truth in connection 
with the legal proceedings" 193 Cal. 
App. 3d at 556-557. 
The court indicated that one of the doc-
tors had filed a report of abuse under Pe-
nal Code section 11166. While his report 
was allowed into evidence, the court did 
not allow the defendant access to the doc-
tors notes, would not allow the defense to 
call the doctor as a witness, and foreclosed 
any cross examination of Cindy about 
statements that she made to the doctor. 
The court found this error to be of "consti-
tutional dimension and stated: 
[the defendant was "foreclosed 
from fully and effectively confront-
ing the major witness against him 
about the very statements making 
up her complaint. In limiting cross 
examination, the court allowed 
Cindy, through the people, to in-
voke a privilege which she no longer 
held concerning her statements to 
[thedoctorJ.193Cal. App. 3d at 557. 
101 Child Abu .. and Neglect Reporting 
Act, Penal Code Section 11164-11174.1 
To combat child abuse, speciallegtsla-
tion has been enacted to require psycho-
therapists to report to a child protective 
agency allknownand suspected instances 
of child abuse. Any information which is 
so reported is not protected under either 
the physician-patient privilege or under 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
In People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal. 
3d 505, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431,668P. 2d 738 the 
psychotherapist reported an incident of 
suspected child abuse to the authorities. 
After making the report, the doctor met 
with the defendant. The police called the 
doctor after this meeting and advised him 
that he was obligated to report the content 
of his conversations with the defendant. 
At trial, the defense objected that these 
disclosures were privileged. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court agreed. The court es-
tablishes the foundations of the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege and states: 
For reasons of policy the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege has been broadly 
construed in favor of the patient. The 
privilege has been recognized as an as-
pect of the patient's constitutional right 
to privacy. 34 Cal. 3d at 511. 
*** 
We [recognize] our obligation to con-
strue narrowly any exception to the psy-
chotherapist patient privilege: we must 
apply such an exception only when the 
patient's case falls squarely within its 
ambit. 34 Cal. 3d at 513 
The court went on to hold that the 
doctor was under no statutory obligation 
to make the second report concerning the 
same activity unless he had learned of 
additional incidents either with the same 
child or with other children. However, 
he satisfied his requirements under the 
statute by making the initial report. 
The psychotherapist is not required to 
warn the patient that he has a duty to 
report child abuse, although there is a 
suggestion that a warning should be 
given if there is a duty to report addi-
tional details after the first session. In 
People v. Stritzinger (]983) 34 Cal. 3d 
505,513-514, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668P. 2d 
738. Even if the psychotherapist warns 
the patient at the first session, there is no 
obligation to give similar warnings at 
subsequent sessions. People v. John B. 
(1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1079, 237 
Cal. Rptr. 59. Requiring warnings might 
undermine a psychotherapists' ability to 
provide meaningful therapy to the pa-
tient which is harmful to the patient and 
to the public. Because repeated warnings 
will eviscerate confidentiality, deter 
therapy, and frustrate the goal of stop-
ping child abuse, they are not required. 
People v. Iohn B. (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 
at 1078-1079. 
The privilege is waived when the pa-
tient discloses or consents to disclose a 
significant part of the privileged conunu-
nication. 
The California Supreme Court In Re 
Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 85 Cal. 
Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, made it clear that 
the mere disclosure of the existence of the 
psychotherapist-patient relationship 
does not reveal a significant part of the 
communication and thus does notconsti-
tute a waiver. In addition, a disclosure 
simply of the purpose of any psychiatric 
treatment does not constitute a signifi-
cant portion of a communication. 
InRe: Fred I: (979) 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 
152 Cal. Rptr. 327, the court found a 
waiver by the mother as to any privilege 
she may have had as to the testimony of 
two psychiatrists who had examined her 
children. The mother had signed several 
release forms and had previously directed 
the doctor to disclose the information to 
various state agencies. The court found: 
"To the extent that the mother might 
have had a privilege ... she waived it by 
disclosure or consent to disclose. 89 Cal. 
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